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Abstract 
We  study  how  the  availability  of  domestic  credit  influences  the  contribution  that 
financing activities make to a firm’s return on equity (ROE). Using a sample of 51,866 
firms from 69 countries, we find that financing activities contribute more to a firm’s ROE 
in countries with higher domestic credit. The higher contribution of financing activities is 
not driven by firms taking greater leverage in these countries, but by firms realizing a 
higher spread (i.e., a greater difference in operating performance and borrowing cost) 
when more domestic credit is available. Also, we find that firms partially substitute trade 
credit for financial credit, with large firms exhibiting the greatest rate of substitution. For 
small firms, the rate of substitution improves with the country’s available domestic credit, 
while large firms are insensitive to this friction. The findings suggest that both country 
and firm-level factors have a significant impact on how financing activities contribute to 
corporate performance. 
 
Keywords: Domestic Credit, Financial Statement Analysis, Return on Equity, Corporate 
Performance 
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  The main objective of financial statement analysis is to understand the different sources of 
a firm’s profitability, typically measured as the return on equity. Further, a basic premise of 
financial  economics  is  that  financial  markets  aid  the  flow  of  capital  to  its  best  use.    In  a 
frictionless world every firm’s return on equity would equal the firm’s cost of equity capital.  
However,  numerous  frictions  at  the  firm  and  country  level  cause  return  on  equity  to  vary 
considerably within and across countries.  We study one prominent friction, the availability of 
domestic credit from banks, and ask how this friction influences the contribution that financing 
activities make to the firm’s return on equity. 
  To better understand the source of a firm’s performance, it is common to decompose a 
firm’s return on equity into the amount earned from the net operating assets and the incremental 
contribution created by financing activities.  Because equity owners claim all the residual profit 
after satisfying the debt payments, financial leverage increases the return on equity when the net 
operating assets are more profitable than the cost of borrowing.   The financing contribution to 
return on equity is thus the product of financial leverage and the spread between the return on 
assets and the net borrowing cost.  We investigate how differences in the availability of domestic 
credit  across  countries  influences  the  resulting  leverage,  spread,  and  the  net  financing 
contribution to firms’ return on equity.   
  There is ample evidence that financial development in a country eases firms’ financing 
constraints and consequently has a positive influence on the country’s growth (see Levine 2005 
for a review).  But these findings do not imply that the growth is profitable to the corporate 
sector.  In fact, if there are diminishing marginal returns to investment then more growth will 
result in less profitability (see, for example, Fairfield et al. 2003).  Further, previous research has  
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argued  that  the  benefits  of  better  financial  market  development  should  accrue  primarily  to 
smaller firms in a country because they are the marginal borrowers (Love 2003 and Beck et al. 
2005).  Because small firms are relatively less profitable than large firms (e.g., Hall and Weiss 
1967, Fama and French 1995, or Li et al. 2012), it is not clear how more rapid growth funded by 
easier access to debt capital will influence their return on equity.
1  
  One simple possibility is that firms in countries with less available bank credit employ less 
financial leverage, consequently get a sm aller contribution from financing activities, and  earn 
lower return on equity. However, it is also possible that firms in these countries have adapted 
such that they can effectively gain financial leverage through various operating decisions.  For 
instance, if suppliers grant firms in these countries longer trade terms, and charge slightly higher 
prices, then the suppliers are effectively lending the firm money and  charging interest.  Another 
possibility is that firms in countries with limited  domestic bank credit choose to lease more of 
their assets.  In this case the lessor is effectively acting as a secured lender.   In cases like these, 
firms substitute operating leverage for financial leverage,  where the counterparty plays both  an 
operating and a financing role in the economy.   Of course, trade credit serves many purposes 
beyond financing downstream customers, and so it is unclear how effectively firms can substitute 
one source of financing for another (see Fisman and Love 2003 for a theory of trade credit).  We 
examine  how  the  financing  contribution  to  firms’  return  on  equity  trades  off  against  the 
contribution  from  trade  credit,  and  how  the  availability  of  domestic  credit  in  the  country 
influences this trade-off.   
                                                        
1 Jeremy Grantham, Chief Strategist of GMO Capital, remarked in an interview with Pat Dorsey of Morningstar on 
May 28, 2009 that “in the end, returns to the stock market are overwhelming to do with return on capital.  It isn’t 
about top-line growth….growth countries have no history of reliably beating slower growth countries, although 
everyone thinks it is the case.”  
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The financing contribution to return on equity depends on both the amount of financial 
leverage and the spread between the profitability of the underlying operations and the borrowing 
cost  –  it only  contributes  a positive amount if the firm  is  leveraging  operations  that earn  a 
positive spread. Given this, one might think that firms with better operating performance would 
employ greater levels of financial leverage and enjoy even higher returns on equity.  A long-
standing puzzle in the finance and accounting literature is that this is not the case – firms that 
earn more tend to borrow less (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales 1995 or Nissim and Penman 
2001).    We  observe  this  relation  in  our  data  as  well,  but  find  that  this  behavior  does  not 
determine the contribution of financing to the return on equity.  By studying only one part of the 
financial contribution – leverage – this literature misses the other important piece of the puzzle – 
the spread.  We show that, at least for the largest firms in the economy, while the leverage 
decreases  with  operating  performance,  the  spread  increases  even  more,  such  that  the  net 
contribution from financing is increasing in the firms’ operating performance.
2 
  A common theme running through all our results is that the influence of domestic credit in 
a  country,  the  rate  that  trade  credit  and  financial  credit  substitute  for  each  other,  and  how 
operating performance flows through to the financial performance, all depend critically on the 
relative  size  of  the  firm  in  its  home  economy.  The  simple  observation  that  small  firms  are 
fundamentally different than large firms in terms of financing options is echoed in Beck et al. 
(2008) who find in survey data that small firms claim that they receive relatively less bank 
financing and cannot compensate for this lack of financial credit with trade credit.  
  To examine these questions we collect 31 years of financial data from firms in 69 different 
countries.  After controlling for a firm’s operating performance and the contribution from trade 
                                                        
2 Li et al. 2012 tackle the operating contribution to ROE by modeling how a firm’s international segment mix can be 
combined with country-level profitability forecasts to yield predictions of firm-level return on assets.    
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credit, as well as for year and industry fixed effects, we find that the financing contribution to 
return on equity increases with available domestic credit in the country.  However, most of the 
benefit accrues to the largest firms in the economy.  A unit increase in domestic credit as a 
percent of gross domestic product (roughly the difference between Ireland and the United States) 
corresponds to a 1.4 percent increase in the financing contribution for the largest tercile of firms 
in  their  respective  economies,  but  only  a  0.5  percent  increase  for  the  smallest  tercile  of 
companies. 
  One might expect that firms with more profitable operations would deploy more financial 
leverage and enjoy a higher contribution to ROE from financing.  But, consistent with a number 
of prior studies, we find that leverage is decreasing in the profitability of operations.  However, 
we also find that the spread increases with operating profitability, and that leverage and spread 
are negatively correlated, so that for the largest firms in the economy, approximately one third of 
the operating profitability spills over as an additional financial contribution.  The same benefit 
does not accrue to the smallest firms because they often have negative leverage, so increasing the 
spread actually lowers the financial contribution to ROE. 
  We also find that firms substitute trade credit for financial credit.  For the largest firms in 
the  economy,  a  one  percent  higher  contribution  from  trade  credit  is  associated  with 
approximately a half percent lower contribution from finance, and for these large firms, the 
relation is insensitive to the country’s level of domestic credit.  However, for small and medium 
sized firms, the rate of substitution between trade credit and financial credit increases with the 
country’s available domestic credit. The intuition for this result is that, for small and medium 
sized  firms  in  low  domestic  credit  countries,  trade  credit  serves  purposes  beyond  adding 
operating leverage.  For these firms trade credit helps resolve the information asymmetry and  
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agency problems between the firm and its upstream supplier, and these forces work against a 
perfect substitution between trade credit and financial credit. Larger firms, or firms in countries 
with high levels of domestic credit, have other means of resolving these conflicts. 
  Because our dataset covers 31 years, 69 countries, and 51,866 firms, we can control for 
substantial cross-sectional correlation between firm-year residuals.  Our main results are based 
on regressions with standard errors clustered at the year and country level, allowing for a general 
pattern of within-country and within-year residual correlation. We also corroborate our cross-
sectional results with an analysis of large changes in available domestic credit.  We find that 
changes  in  domestic  credit  are  positively  associated  with  future  changes  in  the  financial 
contribution  to  ROE,  changes  in  operating  performance  are  associated  with  changes  in  the 
financing contribution, and changes in trade performance are negatively associated with changes 
in the financing contribution, all consistent with our larger cross-sectional model.   
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we decompose the return on 
equity into an operating component, a trade credit component, and a financing component.  In 
section three we develop hypotheses for how the availability of domestic credit influences the 
financing  component,  how  operating  performance  spills  over  into  additional  financial 
performance, and how domestic credit influences the trade-off between the financing component 
and the trade credit component.  In section four we describe our data and empirical measures of 
these components, and present some summary statistics.  We present our main results in section 
five and conclude in section six. 
 
2. Return on Equity Decomposition 
  The study of firm performance in accounting has used the Dupont decomposition as a  
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means of identifying the relative contribution of different firm activities.  Nissim and Penman 
(2001) originally documented a number of summary statistics about margins, turnover ratios, and 
leverage for a large panel of US firms from 1963 to 1999.  Nissim and Penman (2003) further 
distinguished between operating leverage and financial leverage and showed that this distinction 
aids in the prediction of future return on equity.  We closely follow the decomposition proposed 
in Nissim and Penman (2003) and divide the return on equity into three different components as 
described below.  The Datastream variable definitions are given in the footnotes. 
  Consider two decompositions of return on equity.  The first is found in most financial 
statement analysis textbooks (see Lundholm and Sloan 2007, Penman 2010, or Palepu et al. 
2004):  
 
ROE = Net Income/Common Equity 
 
         = RNOA + LEV * (RNOA – NBC), where 
 
RNOA   is Return on Net Operating Assets, computed as  
    Net Operating Income
3, 4/Net Operating Assets
5, 
LEV    is Financial Leverage, computed as Net Financial Obligations/Common Equity, and 
 
NBC     is net borrowing cost, computed as Net Interest Expense/ Net Financial Obligations, 
and    SPREAD is RNOA – NBC. 
 
 
The spread determines when financial leverage (LEV) contributes to firms profit beyond the 
                                                        
3 Net Operating Income = Net income (WC01706) + Net Interest Expense, where Net Interest Expense is interest 
expense*(1-effective tax rate).  
4 Interest expense (WC01075) for non -financial firms is often missing in Datastream. For firm -observations with 
missing interest information, we impute the interest expense as the difference between EBT  (earnings before tax, 
WC01401) and EBIT (earnings before interest and tax, WC18191). Effective tax rate is computed as the tax expense 
(WC01451) divided by net income before tax. If net income before tax is negative, we set the effective tax rate to be 
zero. 
5 Net Operating Assets = Common equity (WC03501)+ Net Financial Obligations, where Net Financial Obligations 
equals total debt (WC03255) less cash and cash equivalent (WC02001).  
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return on net operating assets (RNOA).  If the spread is positive, taking on financial leverage will 
allow profits to increase beyond the existing RNOA.  If the spread is negative however, LEV 
will reduce profitability below the existing RNOA level.  The key observation from the first 
model is that LEV amplifies the spread between operating performance (as given by RNOA) and 
the cost of borrowing (as given by NBC).  
  In addition to debt financing (as given by LEV), firms can also take on leverage through 
various  operating  decisions.    For  instance,  firms  can  effectively  borrow  from  suppliers  by 
extending the time they take to pay their accounts payable.  Also, firms can advance cash from 
customers with the obligation to service customers in the future, incurring deferred revenues.  
Using such operating leverage may not come for free and is often at a higher cost than financial 
leverage (Wilner 2000).  We examine the contribution of operating leverage by decomposing the 
RNOA  into  the  pure  operating  effect  and  the  trade  credit  effect  that  comes  from  operating 
leverage. The second decomposition is: 
 
  RNOA = Net Operating Income/Net Operating Assets 
                = ROOA + OPLEV * (ROOA – IITC), where  
  ROOA  is Return on Operating Assets = Operating Income
6 /Operating Assets
7, 
  OPLEV   is Operating Liabilities
8 /Net Operating Assets, 
  IITC     is Imputed Interest Rate on Trade Credit = imputed interest expense on trade 
  credit/operating liabilities. 
                                                        
6 Operating Income = Net operating income + Imputed Interest expense on Trade Credit, where Imputed Interest 
expense on Trade Credit = local borrowing rate*Operating Liabilities* (1-effective tax rate). For the local borrowing 
rate, we use the short term deposit interest rate of each country from the World Development Indicators (provided 
by the World Bank). For countries with a missing borrowing rate, we use the country’s lending interest rate from the 
World Development Indicator. Lending interest rate is defined as the rate charged by banks on loans to prime 
customers. 
7 Operating Assets = Total Assets (WC02999) - cash and cash equivalent (WC02001). 
8 Operating Liabilities = Total Liabilities (WC03351) -Total debt(WC03255).  
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The key observation from the second model is that OPLEV amplifies the spread between a pure 
measure of operating performance before any trade credit (as given by ROOA) and the imputed 
interest from the trade credit (as given by IITC).  From this we construct the identity: 
 
ROE = Operating Contribution + Trade Credit Contribution + Financial Contribution,   (1) 
 
where 
 
Pure Operating Contribution (OP)   is     ROOA,  
 
Trade Credit Contribution (TRADE)    is   RNOA-ROOA =  OPLEV * (ROOA – IITC) and 
 
Financial Contribution (FIN)       is  ROE-RNOA = LEV * (RNOA – NBC). 
 
 
Thus,  a  firm’s  profitability,  as  measured  by  ROE,  can  be  constructed  as  a  pure  operating 
contribution OP, plus the contribution from using trade credit TRADE, plus the contribution 
from financing activities FIN.  Further, both TRADE and FIN are products of the amount of 
leverage, either operating leverage or financial leverage, and the spread between the underlying 
profitability being levered and the cost of the leverage.  Our main variable of interest is FIN.  We 
also study FIN’s components LEV and SPREAD, and how the OP and TRADE components of 
ROE trade off against FIN as a function of a country’s domestic credit provided by the banking 
sector.   
 
3. Related Literature 
  We investigate three issues:  a) does  a  country’s  level  of domestic credit influence the 
financial  contribution  to  ROE,  b)  does  the  financing  contribution  increase  with  the  firms’ 
operating contribution, and is the relation based on a leverage effect or a spread effect, and c)  
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does the level of domestic credit influence the trade-off between the financing contribution and 
the trade credit contribution?  And, for all these relations, does the relative size of the firm in its 
country matter?  These questions touch on a variety of prior work in accounting, finance, and 
economics that we summarize next. 
 
Why Might Domestic Credit Influence the Financing Contribution to ROE? 
  One of our main variables of interest is the sum of all available domestic credit granted 
by banks and similar financial institutions in a country, expressed as a percent of the country’s 
gross domestic product (a precise definition is given later).  This measure is commonly used in 
the international finance literature as an indicator of the development of a country’s financial 
system. Because the financing contribution to ROE requires access to debt, the first-order effect 
is  that  more  domestic  credit  should  be  associated  with  greater  leverage,  all  else  equal.    In 
addition,  if  more  domestic  credit  implies  a  more  competitive  market  for  loans  then  the  net 
borrowing cost should be lower and the spread should be higher.  Because both components of 
the financial contribution, leverage and spread, are hypothesized to increase with the level of 
domestic credit, it would seem obvious that the financing contribution should also increase with 
domestic  credit.    However,  this  prediction  is  complicated  by  the  empirical  observation  that 
leverage and profitability are negatively related, as discussed in the next section.   
  In a study of 19 developed and 11 developing countries, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) find no evidence that the availability of domestic credit influences the capital structure for 
the largest firms in a country.  For the smallest firms in a country the evidence is mixed, with 
some specifications suggesting the relation between domestic credit and leverage is positive but 
other specifications suggesting it is negative.  The authors reason that the smallest firms in a  
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country are marginal borrowers and consequently their leverage depends on the development of 
the banking sector, whereas the largest firms are infra-marginal and consequently have their 
needs met even in a country with an underdeveloped banking system.  
  De Jong et al (2008) sample a large panel of firms from 42 countries and find that the 
association between leverage and firm-specific variables often changes across countries.  Two 
variables,  size  and  profitability,  behave  consistently,  with  leverage  increasing  with  size  and 
decreasing with profitability in 38 of 42 countries.  They also find that, after controlling for these 
firm-specific  factors,  a  country’s  average  leverage  increases  with  the  development  of  the 
country’s bond market.
9 These results suggest two firm-specific factors, size and profitability, 
and one country-level factor, the development of the country’s ability to provide debt financing, 
will be related to leverage.  Although leverage is only one part of the financial contribution to 
ROE, these results suggest a starting point for our model. 
 
The Relation between the Financing Contribution and the Operating Contribution to ROE 
  Recall that the financial contribution to ROE is the product of the financial leverage and 
the spread between the return on net operating assets and the net borrowing cost.  It is almost 
immediate  that  the  spread  is  therefore  increasing  in  the  Pure  Operating  Effect  (ROOA),  as 
ROOA is a large component of RNOA and RNOA is the positive component of the Spread.  
Unfortunately,  the  relation  between  financial  leverage  and  operating  performance  is  far  less 
clear. The original study is Rajan and Zingales (1995) who find that the determinants of leverage 
for firms in the G7 countries are basically the same as the determinants found in the US-based 
literature; leverage generally increases with firm size, asset tangibility, and decreases with the 
                                                        
9 While the bond market development is different than the domestic credit provided by banks, we show later that 
these two measures are correlated at .77, so they clearly measure similar things.  
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market-to-book ratio and firm profitability.  Booth et al. (2001) undertake a similar study in 10 
developing countries and find some support for the same variables used in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), but also find that the only consistent result across all countries is that leverage decreases 
with profitability.  This seemingly anomalous result has been documented repeatedly, and we 
find it in our data as well.  Although one might expect that more profitable firms would lever 
their operating success, the empirical result is that they do the opposite.  The most satisfactory 
explanation for this result is that firms follow the pecking-order theory of capital structure and 
prefer to fund capital investment first with internally-generated funds, and then with debt, and 
finally with equity.  The pecking order follows the degree of information asymmetry between the 
capital  provider  and  the  firm.
10   Consequently, more profitable firms  have more internally-
generated funds, and therefore  need less external funding, and this causes a negativ e relation 
between profitability and leverage (see Myers 2001 for a review of theories of capital structure).  
  Putting the two effects together, we expect that the spread will increase and leverage will 
decrease  with operating performance, resulting in an   ambiguous prediction for the relation 
between the financing contribution and the operating contribution to ROE.   Booth et al. (2001) 
also find that country fixed effects add significant explanatory power beyond the firm -specific 
variables,  suggesting  that   country  characteristics  play  an  important  role  in  understanding 
leverage ratios around the world.   
 
Does Trade Credit Substitute for Financial Credit in its Contribution to ROE? 
  Nilsen (2002) reports that for U.S. manufacturing firms, accounts payable averages 13 
percent of total liabilities, so trade credit is an important source of  funds for many firms.  As 
                                                        
10 Recent support for the pecking order theory is in Naranjo et al. (2012) who show that firms increased debt 
financing a little, and equity financing a lot, following the adoption of IFRS, presumably because IFRS lowered the 
information asymmetry between capital providers and firms, especially for equity providers.  
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derived  above,  the  trade  credit  contribution  to  ROE  is  the  product  of  how  much  operating 
leverage the firm employs and the spread between the pure return on operating assets and the 
implied interest rate on the trade credit.  Choi and Kim (2005) and Klapper et al. (2011) describe 
a number of theories of trade credit that address the level of operating leverage but not the spread 
between the pure operating return and the implied interest rate on the trade credit.  
  The  financing  view  of  trade  credit  posits  that  ﬁrms  with  better  access  to  capital  will 
redistribute the credit they receive to less advantaged ﬁrms via trade credit.  These firms can 
sometimes play the role of lender better than a bank because they have superior information or 
better contracting opportunities with the trade partner.  Compared to banks, suppliers know the 
quality of goods provided and the likelihood of downstream sales, and are in a better position to 
reclaim and resell the inventory in the event of a default.  The impact of a country’s level of 
domestic credit on the level and implied interest on trade credit thus depends on when other 
constraints  bind  on  this  process.    One  possibility  is  that  more  domestic  credit  flows  down 
through all levels of creditworthiness and increases the use of both financial credit and trade 
credit;  in  this  case the  two types  of financing  would appear  complementary.   Alternatively, 
because the implied interest on trade credit is typically higher than on similar bank financing 
(Wilner 2000), more domestic credit could lower the cost of bank financing relative to trade 
credit and cause firms to substitute financial credit for trade credit.  Further, assuming that larger 
firms  are  generally  more  creditworthy,  they  are  more  likely  to  be  the  firms  redistributing 
financial credit downward through trade credit while smaller firms are more likely to be the 
recipients.   
  Trade credit also serves non-financial purposes.  Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that trade 
credit can be used as a mechanism for price discrimination without running afoul of anti-trust  
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laws.  Long et al. (1993) posit that trade credit allows the buyer to verify the quality of goods 
before paying for them, thus resolving some information  asymmetry between trade partners.  
These motives for trade credit are unlikely to be influenced by the availability of domestic credit, 
and consequently buffer any substitutability or complementarity between financial credit and 
trade credit caused by the level of available domestic credit. It is likely that these motives for 
trade credit also differ between large firms and small firms, insofar as small firms may be subject 
to greater information asymmetry and contracting problems than large firms. 
  Empirically, the prior results are mixed.  For a sample of US firms, Petersen and Rajan 
(1997) find that trade credit and bank credit are substitutes.  However, in a sample covering 39 
countries, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) find that the use of trade credit increases with 
the country’s availability of domestic credit, concluding that these two sources of financing are 
complementary.
11  Further, in a unique database of 30,000 actual trade contracts from the US and 
Europe, Klapper et al. (2011) find that non -financial motives for trade credit appear to be the 
most relevant. 
  The results above speak to the relative levels  of financial and trade credit, but not to the 
effective spread on trade credit.  Consequently, it is unclear how the financing contribution and 
the trade credit contribution to ROE will be related. In addition, how this relation varies across 
countries with differing levels of domestic credit will reveal how important the redistributive role 
of trade credit is in the economy relative to the non-financial motives for trade credit. 
 
 
                                                        
11 There is a large literature on how financial crises impact the relative use of financial or trade credit, which also 
produces mixed results. Several studies find that during market downturns, trade credit flows from firms with better 
access to bank financing to firms with less access to this financing options (Choi and Kim 2005 and Nilsen 2002). 
However, other studies find no such redistribution for financially constrained firms (Love and Zaidi 2010).  
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Size Matters 
  The  previous  theoretical  and  empirical  work  suggests  that  the  relation  between  the 
financing contribution and other variables may be conditioned on the relative size of the firm in 
its home economy.  Firms report that this is indeed the case.  Based on a survey of 3,000 firms in 
48 countries, Beck et al. (2005) find that small and medium-sized firms report that financing is 
an obstacle to growth in countries with lower levels of domestic credit.  These firms report 
obstacles  due  to  high  interest  rates,  collateral  requirements,  bank  bureaucracy,  or  lack  of 
available funds for lending; the largest firms in the country report no such obstacles. Using the 
same survey data, Beck et  al  (2008) find that  the  smallest  firms  use less  bank financing in 
general, and especially in countries with low levels of domestic credit, and that they are not able 
to adequately substitute leasing or trade credit relative to the largest firms in the economy. 
 
4. The Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
  We construct our sample from Thomson Datastream and collect financial data for firms 
in 69 different countries from year 1980 to 2010.  We require firms to have sufficient financial 
data to compute the return on equity, return on net operating assets, and leverage.  We eliminate 
countries with less than 50 firm-years throughout the sample period, firm-years with total assets 
or net operating assets that are less than zero, and firm-years with market value less than USD 1 
million. Finally, consistent with prior financial statement analysis studies, we eliminate firms 
from  the  financial  industry  because  the  separation  of  financing  and  operating  activities  is 
artificial for such firms (e.g., Nissim and Penman 2001, Fairfield and Yohn 2001, Fairfield et al 
2003, Soliman 2008, Richardson et  al  2009, or  Li et al  2012).
 12 Also  consistent  with  prior 
                                                        
12 Financial industries include all sectors with Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) codes 8300(banks), 8500 
(insurance companies), 8700 (financial services), and 8900 (equity instruments).  
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studies we eliminate observations with extreme financial ratios.  Specifically, we eliminate firms 
with return on equity or return on net operating assets greater than 100% or less than -100%, and 
eliminate  firms  with  net  borrowing  costs  greater  than  100%.    Because  there  is  no  obvious 
threshold for deletion for leverage or spread, we instead truncate extreme values at the 1% and 
99% level. The final sample is 51,866 firms (343,718 firm-years) from 69 countries. Table 1 
shows a summary of the firm-years used in our analysis. 
  Our main interest is whether the financing contribution to return on equity increases with 
financial development in the country.  While the financing activities of firms typically include 
both  debt  and  equity-based  financing,  only  non-equity  financing  creates  the  leverage  that 
increases  ROE.    We  therefore  use  a  proxy  of  financial  development  that  focuses  on  the 
development of the banking sector.  Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and a host of other 
studies  in  international  finance,  we  measure  banking  sector  development  using  the  level  of 
domestic credit provided by the banking sector from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicator (IFS items 22a-22f).
13  This measure computes the gross credit provided by monetary 
authorities, deposit money banks, and other banking institutions (such as savings and mortgage 
loan institutions and building and loan associations).  The measure, labeled DOMC, is scaled by 
the country’s GDP and is available on an annual basis.  For our cross-sectional tests we average 
DOMC over the three years centered on the current year to minimize the effects of temporary 
changes in the country’s credit availability or temporary changes in the country’s GDP.  For our 
analysis of large changes in domestic credit in table 7, we use the change in the annual values of 
DOMC.  
                                                        
13 Other studies that use this measure of financial development include Levine and Zervos (1998), Fisman and Love 
(1995),  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1998),  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Maksimovic  (1999),  Beck  et  al.  (2000), 
Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., Levine, R. (2001), and Beck and Levine (2004).  
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  By lowering financing obstacles, domestic credit provided by the banking sector has been 
shown to be related to a country’s rate of economic growth (see Fisman and Love 2003 or 
Levine 2005 for a review).  The measure is not perfect for our purposes, however.  It is limited to 
credit availability via the banking sector and may fail to proxy for development of the country’s 
public bond or international bond market.  The World Bank database also includes an annual 
country measure of bond market borrowing, but this variable is not available for as many years 
or as many countries, and consists mostly of bonds issued by financial institutions, which are not 
relevant to our study.  As a practical matter, the domestic credit market is three times as large as 
the bond market for the average country in the average year, and is by far the most commonly 
used measure of financial market development in the international finance literature. We later 
test the robustness of our analysis using an alternative measure that adds the size of the bond 
market to the numerator of our domestic credit measure and find similar results, likely because 
this alternative measure has a 0.77 Spearman correlation with our measure.
14 
Table 2 shows the level of domestic credit (DOMC) for all 69 countries in our sample.  
The mean domestic credit is 0.90 of the country’s GDP.  The measure varies significantly across 
countries ranging from 0.10 of GDP for the lowest country (Saudi Arabia) to 2.95 for the highest 
country (Japan).  This variation can be seen in Figure 1 where we plot the mean domestic credit 
ordered from smallest to largest.  Figure 1 shows that special attention needs to be paid to Japan 
which makes up 16 percent of the firm-year observations and has the highest level of domestic 
credit at 2.95.  This level is 2.3 times higher than the average country and 20 percent higher than 
the next highest country.  Our tests partly control for this by constructing firm size portfolios 
                                                        
14 A country’s financial development can also be measured by the development of its equity market (see Levine and 
Zervos 1998).  However, as the Dupont model shows, equity does not create financial leverage and so is not relevant 
to our study.  
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within country, and then pooling across countries.  In additional analysis we also show that our 
results are very similar when we eliminate Japan from the sample. 
  Recalling the decomposition of ROE from the previous section, Table 3 Panel A shows the 
distribution of each component of ROE using all firm-years.  The mean ROE is 6.3% and the 
largest component of ROE is OP, followed by TRADE, and then FIN. The mean OP is 6.6% and 
the  mean  and  median  of  FIN  are  both  negative  at  -2.5%  and  -0.5%,  respectively.  It  is  not 
surprising that OP is the largest component – the primary way a firm generates a return on equity 
is through its operations.  It is surprising that FIN is negative for the average firm and close to 
zero for the median firm.  It is worth noting that both leverage and spread are positive on average 
while  FIN,  which  is  the  product  of  leverage  and  spread,  is  negative.    This  suggests  that  a 
considerable amount of companies have the opposite sign for leverage and spread.  That is, firms 
with negative leverage (i.e., firms that hold more cash than debt) often have positive spread, and 
those with positive leverage tend to have a negative spread (i.e., net borrowing costs exceed their 
RNOA).  Indeed, the Spearman correlations in Table 4 confirm a negative correlation between 
leverage and spread of -0.385.   
 
The Contributions to ROE within and across Countries 
  We are interested in how the contribution of financing decisions to a firm’s ROE varies by 
the home country’s financial development.  To begin, consider the averages of OP, TRADE, and 
FIN for each country, sorted on the country mean domestic credit (DOMC) over the sample 
period.  The results are shown in Figure 2.  Three observations are immediate.  First, across all 
levels of DOMC, the largest component of ROE is OP, followed by TRADE, and then by FIN. 
Operating activities are the primary way a firm generates a return on equity and it is on average  
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positive for all countries.  As noted, it is surprising that FIN is negative for the average firm in all 
but  two  countries.    On  average  in  almost  all  countries,  firms’  financing  activities  do  not 
contribute positively to their ROE.  However, the average result hides the enormous variation in 
FIN. 
  The standard deviation of the average FIN across countries is only 0.016 (Table 2), while 
the average standard deviation of FIN within country is 0.106 (untabulated).  There is far greater 
variation in FIN across firms within a country than there is variation in the average FIN across 
countries.    This  suggests  that  the  development  of  financial  markets  in  a  country  is  not  the 
primary driver of the average firm’s ability to generate FIN.  But that is not to say that DOMC is 
unimportant.  In subsequent tests we explore how DOMC influences the contribution of FIN in 
the cross-section of firms within a country.  And, because the finance literature has generally 
concluded  that  a  country’s  financial  development  is  an  important  contributor  to  its  growth 
through increased debt financing, we reconcile these positive findings with our negative ones in 
a later section. 
  The second observation from Figure 2 is that TRADE is generally positive, contributing 
almost  two  percent  to  ROE,  on  average,  across  all  countries.    So  the  average  firm  can 
successfully  leverage  their  operating  performance  using  trade  credit.    This  value  too  has 
variation.  The standard deviation of the average across countries is 0.019 (Table 2) while the 
average  standard  deviation  within  country  is  0.066  (untabulated).    In  subsequent  tests  we 
examine the relation between FIN and TRADE, and how DOMC and firm size influence the 
substitutability between these two sources of credit. 
Third, the average OP varies across countries considerably more than FIN and TRADE.  
The average level of OP across countries is 0.089 with a standard deviation across the country  
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averages of 0.032, almost twice as large as the variation in FIN and TRADE (as seen at the 
bottom of Table 2).  Finally, like the other measures, there is more within country variation in 
OP (0.091, untabulated) than across-country variation.  Because the success or failure of a firm’s 
operations has a direct effect on its ability to successfully employ leverage to increase its ROE, 
we control for OP in all our regressions.  In addition, different countries may have a different 
mix  of  industries,  and  Soliman  (2004)  shows  that  the  Dupont  decomposition  varies 
systematically  with  industries,  so  we  include  industry  fixed  effects  in  all  our  regressions.
15  
Similarly, some years are simply more profitable for all the w orld’s economies than others, so 
we also include year fixed effects in all our regressions.  
 
Descriptive statistics by the relative size of the firm 
  Prior literature has emphasized the importance of DOMC to a country’s ability to use 
leverage. But given our observation that FIN is generally negative, and most of the variation is 
within country, the real question is, does DOMC help some firms in a country more than others? 
To test this, we estimate the relation between DCOM and FIN for samples that include large, 
medium, and small firms. 
Many of the relations we document, and especially the impact of credit availability on 
financial performance, vary significantly with the relative size of the firm within its country.  In 
the results that follow we report the pooled estimates and then the estimates for the smallest, 
middle, and largest terciles of size, where size is measured as the total assets at the end of the 
fiscal  year.    For  our  primary  tests  we  sort  firms  into  terciles  within  country-year  and  then 
combine the terciles.  This procedure groups together similarly ranked firms relative to the other 
                                                        
15 In contrast to Soliman, (2004), Fairfield et al. (2009) find that industry membership is not a useful guide for mean 
reversion  in  ROE  or  RNOA  in  a  sample  of  US  data.    We  still  include  industry  fixed  effects  because  we  are 
examining finer components of ROE, and because we are examining global data.  
 
20 
firms in their country.  So, for instance, the largest firms in Italy are grouped with the largest 
firms in Japan.  This method of matching the relative size of firm within its country is consistent 
with Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).  It is motivated by the idea that the largest firms in 
a  country  have  the  greatest  access  to  financial  markets  and  institutions  in  their  respective 
countries, regardless of their absolute size, while the smallest firms in the country may have 
limited access.    
Table 3 presents summary statistics by size terciles. Panel A shows summary statistics for 
the pooled sample while Panels B and C shows summary statistics for smallest and largest firms, 
respectively (we omit the middle tercile in the summary statistics for brevity).  Comparing panels 
B and C, large firms have higher ROE, OP, FIN, SPREAD, and LEV compared to small firms.  
The average FIN is negative for both large and small firms, consistent with Figure 2, but the 
median FIN is slightly positive for large firms.  In our main empirical tests, we examine whether 
the country’s financial development has a differential effect on FIN across different firm sizes.   
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix of the Dupont components for the full sample, the 
smallest tercile and the largest terciles, in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. As seen in Panel A, 
domestic credit is negatively related to OP and positively related to FIN and TRADE.  The 
positive correlations with FIN and TRADE are suggestive that the financing components of a 
firm,  either  through  financial  credit  or  trade  credit,  are  related  to  the  development  of  the 
country’s banking sector. One of the more noticeable differences between Panels B and C is that 
the correlation between OP and FIN is negative for small firms and positive for large firms. This 
positive correlation for large firms, however, is not due to a more positive correlation between 
OP and LEV or OP and SPREAD.  In fact, large firms have a more negative correlation between 
OP and LEV and a less positive correlation between OP and SPREAD relative to small firms.   
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Instead, the positive relationship between OP and FIN for large firms is because there is a greater 
portion of firms sharing the same sign for LEV and SPREAD than for small firms.  That is, 
among large firms it is more likely that firms with positive (negative) LEV have also positive 
(negative) SPREAD.   
The differences in relations between the components of ROE between large and small 
firms seen in table 4, and the strong impact that OP has on the other components, make it clear 
that these influences need to be accounted for in our regression analysis.   
 
5. Regression analysis 
Our main regression results are organized as  follows.   First, we study how domestic 
credit (DOMC) directly influences the financial contribution to ROE (FIN) and how firm size 
plays  a  central  role  in  understanding  the  contribution  of  DOMC.    Second,  we  examine  the 
relation between the pure operating contribution and the financing contribution, and how OP 
influences the two components of FIN.  Finally, we examine how firms trade-off the different 
financing activities (TRADE and FIN) and how DOMC influences a firm’s trade-off between 
these contributions to ROE.   
 
The direct impact of domestic credit on financial performance 
We examine whether the availability of credit in a country allows some firms to benefit 
from FIN more than others.  To test this, we estimate the following regression: 
 
FIN = b1*DOMC + b2*OP + b3*TRADE + Industry Fixed Effects + Year Fixed Effects      (2)  
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Standard errors are clustered at the country and year level.
16 The results are in Table 5 Panel A. 
Column 1 gives the results for the pooled regression.  We find that, controlling for OP, TRADE, 
and the industry and year fixed effects, financial performance (FIN) increases with the country’s 
domestic credit.  Dividing the sample by the relative firm size, the coefficient on DOMC ranges 
from 0.005 for the smallest firms in the county to 0.014 for the largest firms in the country, as 
seen in columns 2-4.  To get a sense for the economic magnitude, increasing DOMC by one (the 
approximate  difference  between  the  United  States  and  Ireland)  has  an  estimated  impact  of 
increasing FIN by 1.4 percent for the largest firms in the economy, but only 0.5 percent for the 
smallest firms in the economy.  While previous literature has shown how improvements in a 
country’s financial markets benefit the growth rates of small firms more than large firms, we find 
that this result does not apply to the profitability of those firms.   
  Does more domestic credit increase FIN because firms take on more leverage?  This 
would seem to be the obvious interpretation, but recalling that LEV and SPREAD are negatively 
correlated, the answer is unclear.  To understand the source of improved contributions from 
financing activities, we re-estimate the regression replacing FIN with each of its components, 
LEV and SPREAD, with the results in Panels B and C of Table 5, respectively. 
Panel B of Table 5 shows that, for the full sample and for the three size terciles, LEV is 
not significantly related to DOMC. These tepid results are consistent with Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) who find no robust relation between DOMC and LEV for either large or 
small firms. In contrast to the results in Panel B, Panel C of Table 5 shows a large and significant 
relation between DOMC and SPREAD that is relatively stable across all three size terciles; in the 
pooled regression the coefficient of 0.019 implies that a one unit increase in DOMC increases the 
                                                        
16 Firm-level clustering yields the same coefficient estimates and uniformly more significant results.  
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SPREAD by 1.9 percent.  The reason FIN increases much less than the increase in SPREAD is 
because SPREAD and LEV are negatively correlated at the -0.385 level (with similar values in 
each size tercile).  So a complete picture for the pooled sample looks like this: a one unit increase 
in DOMC increases SPREAD by 1.9 percent, but an increase in SPREAD is associated with a 
lower level of LEV, with the net result that FIN only increases by 0.7 percent.  
In untabulated results we divide the sample into those firms with positive versus negative 
LEV and re-estimate the leverage regression above.  Perhaps not surprisingly, for the sample of 
firms that are net borrowers (i.e. positive LEV), these firms take on greater leverage in countries 
with  higher  DOMC.  Moreover,  the  effect  is  marginally  stronger  as  the  firm  size  increases.  
Nonetheless, even for the subsample of firms with positive LEV, the economic magnitude on 
LEV is modest.  The mean LEV for the full sample is 0.543, and increasing DOMC by one unit 
results in an estimated increase in LEV of only 0.018.  In sum, firms in countries with higher 
DOMC  enjoy  a  higher  contribution  from  financing,  but  this  is  not  because  they  take  on 
significantly more leverage; rather, they enjoy a higher spread between their RNOA and the net 
borrowing cost. A possible explanation for this is that countries with relatively more available 
credit have lower net borrowing costs due to greater competition between banks.  Consistent 
with this, we find that the Spearman correlation between DOMC and net borrowing costs is -0.21 
(untabulated). 
 
The relation between the pure operating contribution and the financing contribution to ROE 
The regressions in Table 5 include OP  as a control variable because the bulk of the 
variation in SPREAD is due to OP (see Table 4 Panel A), and so one would think that increases 
in  OP  would  increase  SPREAD  and  consequently  increase  FIN.    That  is,  when  the  firm  is  
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leveraging more profitable operations the impact of the leverage on FIN should be increased.  
The evidence in Table 5 shows that the relationships are more complicated.  In particular, why is 
the coefficient on OP in the pooled regression only 0.070, meaning that a one percent increase in 
OP implies a mere 0.07 percent increase in FIN?  Further, examining columns 2-4 we find that 
the  coefficient  on  OP  is  insignificantly  negative  for  the  smallest  firms  in  their  economy,  a 
significant but modest 0.070 for the middle-sized firms, and a more robust and significant 0.371 
for the largest firms.  To understand these effects, we need to again consider the components of 
FIN in the regressions given in Panels B and C of Table 5. 
As documented in prior literature, Panel B of Table 5 shows a modest but significant 
negative relation between LEV and OP.  The coefficient is the most negative for the largest 
tercile of firms at -2.220.  A one percent increase in OP is associated with a 0.022 decrease in 
leverage (relative to a grand mean of 0.543).  The relation is even smaller for the middle tercile, 
and is insignificantly negative for the smallest tercile of firms.  So, OP has either no effect or a 
negligible negative effect on LEV. Turning to SPREAD, Panel C of Table 5 shows that the 
relation between OP and SPREAD is positive, and declines only slightly as firm size increases.  
A one percent increase in OP is associated with a 0.927 percent increase in SPREAD for the 
smallest tercile of firms, a 0.898 percent increase for the middle tercile of firms, and a 0.841 
percent increase for the largest tercile of firms. Regardless of firm size, most OP flows through 
to SPREAD.  Putting the results together, for the relatively largest firms in the economy, a one 
percent increase in operating contribution is associated with an almost equivalent increase in 
spread,  but  also  causes  the  firm  to  use  less  leverage,  such  that  the  spill-over  effect  on  the 
financing contribution is only 0.371 percent.  For the smallest firms in the economy, the result is 
more complicated.  For a one percent increase in OP, the smallest firms have the largest increase  
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in spread and the smallest reduction in leverage, and yet the contribution from OP that spills over 
to FIN is not significantly different from zero.  This occurs because 43 percent of the smallest 
firms have negative leverage (untabulated), so for these firms an increase in spread is combined 
with negative leverage to produce a reduction in the financial contribution.  This is enough to 
wash out the positive effect that OP has on SPREAD when LEV is positive. 
In  summary,  we  find  a  weakly  negative  relation  between  operating  performance  and 
leverage, consistent with the prior literature, with the strongest relation among the largest firms 
in  the  economy.    However,  this  does  not  imply  a  negative  relation  between  operating 
performance  and  financial  performance.  The  largest  firms  in  the  economy  enjoy  a  modest 
positive  spill-over  effect  from  operating  performance  to  financial  performance,  despite  their 
reduction in leverage. 
 
The trade-off between the financing contribution and the trade credit contribution to ROE 
Figure 2 shows that the contribution to ROE from trade credit (TRADE) is generally 
positive. It is possible that by considering only debt financing (FIN) and not TRADE, we are 
underestimating  the  contribution  of  all  financing  activities  to  ROE.    Firms  could  engage  in 
financing activities that contribute to performance through trade credit, and perhaps increasingly 
so when firms are in countries with a less developed banking sector (DOMC).  We ask whether 
firms  substitute  between  FIN  and  TRADE,  how  perfect  the  substitution  is,  and  how  the 
availability of domestic credit determines which firms get the benefits of trade credit within a 
country. 
First  we  return  to  the  estimated  results  in  Table  5.  Panel  A  shows  the  association 
between  the  financing  contribution  (FIN)  and  the  trade  credit  contribution  (TRADE)  after  
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controlling for the pure operating contribution (OP).  If FIN and TRADE are perfect substitutes, 
the coefficient on TRADE should be negative one.  For the pooled regression in Column 1, the 
estimated  coefficient  on  TRADE  is  -0.504,  suggesting  a  strong  trade-off  between  FIN  and 
TRADE, although the substitution is far from perfect.  Columns 2-4 show that magnitude of the 
trade-off is relatively insensitive to the size of the firm.  A one percent increase in TRADE 
corresponds to a 0.483 percent decrease in FIN for firms in the smallest tercile and a 0.557 
percent  decrease  for  firms  in  the  largest  tercile.    However,  when  we  condition  the  relation 
between FIN and TRADE on the availability of domestic credit, the relative size of the firm 
becomes important.   
To examine whether DOMC influences the rate of substitution between FIN and TRADE 
we add an interaction term between DOMC and TRADE in equation (2). Table 6 shows the 
results.    Column  1  shows  that  for  all  firms  combined,  the  estimated  coefficient  on 
DOMC*TRADE is -0.110, indicating that the substitution between FIN and TRADE gets closer 
to negative one as DOMC increases.  Recall that the range of DOMC across all 69 countries is 
2.85,  and  the  difference  between  Ireland  and  the  United  States  is  approximately  one.    The 
regression indicates that increasing DOMC by one changes the rate of substitution between FIN 
and TRADE by a substantial -0.110.  Firms in countries with more available domestic credit 
substitute more freely between trade credit and financial credit. This finding is at odds with the 
arguments in Fisman and Love (2003) claiming that the substitution between trade credit and 
financial credit should be greater in countries with less financial development.
17 One reason we 
find the opposite relation might be that countries with little available domestic credit might also 
have more agency and information asymmetry problems between suppl ier and customer, and 
                                                        
17 Fisman and Love (2003) do not test the hypothesis that DOMC influences the relation between TRADE and FIN.  
Rather, they study how DOMC influences the rate of real growth in a country and then discuss avenues of causality.    
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trade credit provides a mechanism to resolve these problems.  For instance, Biais and Gollier 
(1997) argue that the extension of trade credit reveals favorable information to other lenders, 
thereby increasing their willingness to lend and this positive source of correlation works against 
the perfect negative substitution between trade credit and financial credit.   
As  further  evidence  on  this  point,  one  might  expect  that  the  smallest  firms  in  the 
economy are subject to the greatest agency and information asymmetry problems.  If this is the 
case then the degree to which these forces work against a perfect substitution between financial 
credit and trade credit should be greatest for the smallest firms.  Consistent with this, we find that 
the coefficient on TRADE becomes uniformly more negative as the firm size increases across 
Columns 2 to 4 in Table 6.  Further, we find that improvements in DOMC significantly affect the 
trade-off between FIN and TRADE for the smallest and middle terciles of firms, but have no 
effect on the largest firms in the economy.  For small and mid-size firms, as DOMC decreases, 
there  is  a  weaker  trade-off  between  FIN  and  TRADE  (i.e.  the  coefficient  gets  further  from 
negative one).  We do not observe such a relationship for large firms, perhaps because for large 
firms  there are  fewer information  asymmetry or agency issues  to  be resolved.  Overall, the 
findings suggest a substitution effect between FIN and TRADE that depends on the availability 
of domestic credit in the country and the extent of the agency and information problems as 
represented by the firm’s relative size in the economy. 
 
Large changes in domestic credit 
  So far all our results have been in the cross-section.  We used industry and year fixed 
effects  and so  the results  should be interpreted as  being relative to  other firms  in  the same 
industry and year.  We also clustered standard errors at the country and year level to account for  
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within country and within year residual correlation.  Nonetheless, any cross-sectional analysis is 
subject  to  the  criticism  that  the  independent  variables  are  only  proxies  for  other  persistent 
omitted variables that drive the true relations.  To address this concern, we examine the relation 
between  annual  changes  in  FIN  and  changes  in  the  independent  variables.    Any  persistent 
omitted variable should be cancelled out in this design.  Because our main variable of interest, 
DOMC is itself relatively persistent, we focus on the country-years in the top or bottom 10 
percent of annual changes in DOMC.  For the top decile this corresponds to a 17 percent average 
increase in DOMC involving 216 country-years and for the bottom decile this corresponds to a 
10 percent average decrease in DOMC involving 209 country-years.
18 
  Because changes in the availability of domestic credit will tak e time to flow through to 
firms’  financing  decisions  and  the  financing  contribution  to  performance,  we  associate  the 
change in DOMC in year t with the change in FIN in year t+1.  However, we still need to control 
for the concurrent operating performance and trade performance, so we include in the regressions 
the changes in OP and TRADE in year t+1.  As before, we cluster the regression standard errors 
by country and year. 
  As a starting point, Panel A of Table 7 shows that the Spearman correlation between the 
change in DOMC and the next year’s change in FIN are positively correlated.  The change in 
DOMC is also correlated with the future change in OP and TRADE, but because changes in OP 
and TRADE are highly correlated, it is hard to identify the marginal relation.  Panels B and C 
present the main regression results.  Because the underlying economic factors that precipitate 
                                                        
18 Country-years included in the bottom decile often represent periods of financial crises. For example, Argentina 
and Brazil experienced a large drop in DOMC (-59% and -58% respectively) in 1990. Both countries suffered a 
sovereign debt crisis in 1990. Brazil in 1994 and Mexico in 1996 are included in the bottom decile sample and 
coincide  with  the  banking  crisis  years  (Kaminsky  and  Reinhart  1999).  Country-years  in  the  top  decile  often 
represent credit expansion years immediately following a crisis. For example, South Korea in 1998 (immediately 
after the Asian crisis) is included in the top decile sample.  
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large increases in domestic credit are likely to be different from the factors that precipitate large 
decreases, we estimate separate regressions for each.   
  The results in Column 1 of Table 7, Panels B and C, are remarkably consistent with the 
cross-sectional  results  in  Tables  5  and  6.  For  both  DOMC  increases  (Panel  B)  and  DOMC 
decreases  (Panel  C), the pooled results  in  Column 1  show that the future change in  FIN  is 
positively associated with the current change in DOMC.  The estimated size of the effect is 
small, although highly significant.  When countries experience large increases or decreases in 
available domestic credit, the firms in the economy respond with different financing decisions 
and experience the associated changes in the financing contribution to ROE from those financing 
decisions. 
  The results for the other change variables also echo the cross-sectional conclusions.  For 
both subsamples, the future change in FIN is positively related to the concurrent future change in 
OP, and negatively related to the concurrent future change in TRADE, as seen in Panels B and C.  
The relation between OP and FIN, now measures in concurrent annual changes, is noticeably 
larger for the biggest tercile of firms in the economy than for the smallest firms.  For the large 
increase subsample in Panel B, the coefficient of 0.601 on the change in future OP shown in 
Column 4 implies that, for the largest firms in the economy, just over 60 percent of the change in 
OP spills over to a change in FIN.  This figure is reduced to 25 percent for the smallest firms in 
the economy.  There is a similar pattern in the subsample of large DOMC decreases, although the 
coefficient estimates are smaller.   
  The results for the change in TRADE also resemble the cross-sectional results.  In the 
pooled model given in Column 1, for both subsamples, future changes in TRADE are negatively 
associated with future changes in FIN.  For both subsamples in Column 1, the coefficient is  
 
30 
about  -0.57,  implying  that  the  trade-off  between  TRADE  and  FIN  is  less  than  perfect,  but 
certainly significant.  A one percent increase in the contribution from TRADE is associated with 
roughly a -.57 decrease in FIN.  Looking at Columns 2-4 in Panels B and C, we see that this 
relation does not vary much with the size of the firm.  It moves slightly more towards perfect 
substitution as firm size increases in the large increase subsample shown in Panel B, but has no 
clear pattern in the large decrease subsample in panel C. 
  In sum, for large increases or decreases in available domestic credit, the relations we find 
between future changes in the financing contribution and the other variables  are remarkably 
consistent  with  the  cross-sectional  results  reported  earlier.    Changes  in  the  future  financing 
contribution to ROE are positively related with changes in domestic credit, positively related 
with changes in the operating contribution, and negatively related to changes in the contribution 
from trade credit.    
   
Sensitivity analysis 
Excluding Japan 
As previously discussed, companies from Japan constitute a large portion of our sample 
and, at the same time, Japan has the highest level of available domestic credit. To ensure that our 
results are not unduly influenced by Japanese firms, in Table 8, Panel A we exclude all firms 
from Japan and re-estimate our regressions.  The results are very similar to those reported in 
Table 5.  The coefficient  on DOMC increases monotonically from  Column 2 to  Column  4.  
Domestic credit availability has no effect on the financial contribution for the smallest firms in 
the economy but for largest firms a one unit increase in DOMC generates a two percent increase  
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in the financing contribution to ROE.  Also consistent with our prior results, Table 8 Panel A 
shows that increases in OP flow through to increases in FIN, at least for the middle and largest 
firms  in  the  economy,  and  there  is  a  partial  substitution  between  TRADE  and  FIN  that  is 
relatively insensitive to firm size. 
Including Bond Market Data 
Our DOMC measure captures the depth of credit availability in the banking sector and is 
the most common measure of a country’s financial development used in the prior literature.  
However, the measure does not include financial credit from publicly issued corporate bonds. 
The two measures of financial credit are highly correlated (0.77), but to the extent that firms gain 
debt financing from corporate bond markets, and this is not perfectly correlated with the amount 
of bank credit in country, DOMC has measurement error. As discussed earlier, there is no good 
solution to this problem. The only country-level measure of bond issuances mixes together bonds 
issued by financial and non-financial firms, but our study excludes financial firms because the 
distinction  between  operating  and  financing  activities  does  not  apply  to  financial  firms. 
Nonetheless, we repeat the analysis after adding the bond market data to the domestic credit data 
and then scaling by GDP.  In Table 8, Panel B we report the result of estimating equation (2) 
after replacing DOMC with our alternative measure.  Again, the results are very similar to the 
results  in  Table  5.    The  coefficient  on  DOMC  increases  monotonically  from  Column  2  to 
Column 4, although compared to Table 5 the economic size of the effect is slightly reduced. 
 
Accounting Comparability  
 
32 
Throughout our analysis, we have decomposed ROE into its operating, financing and 
trade  components  assuming  that  the  underlying  accounting  items  are  comparable  across 
countries.  This is a simplification because different countries have different accounting regimes 
and so the OP, TRADE and FIN ratios do not measure precisely the same thing in each country.  
To see if this is a significant source of noise in our model, in Table 8 Panel C we restrict our 
analysis to country-years that report under either IFRS or US GAAP.
19  As seen in the table, the 
results are similar to those reported in Table 5 suggesting that a lack of accounting comparability 
does not influence our inferences significantly.  As before, the coefficient on DOMC increases 
monotonically and, for the largest firms, a one unit increase in DOMC is associated with a  2.1 
percent increase in the financing contribution to ROE.  The results for OP and TRADE are also 
similar in magnitude and significance to those reported in Table 5. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  What does this teach us that might be useful for financial statement analysis? Where a 
firm  resides,  and  its  relative  size  in  that  country,  has  a  major  impact  on  how  the  firm’s 
profitability is affected by its financing activities.  Large firms in countries with well-developed 
banking systems enjoy the largest financing contributions to ROE.  This occurs despite the fact 
that they lower their leverage as their operating profit increases.  The largest firms also come the 
closest  to  a  perfect  substitution  between  trade  credit  and  financial  credit,  and  this  financial 
flexibility is not limited to the most well-developed countries. 
                                                        
19 Even though the US has not adopted IFRS, after 2005 US GAAP converged significantly with IFRS (Hail et al. 
2010).  
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  In contrast, the smallest firms gain the least from financing activities, regardless of the 
development of their home country’s banking system. In fact, because they often have negative 
leverage, increases in their pure operating profit actually lower the financing contribution to 
ROE.  The development of the banking system has a significant impact on the ability of the 
smallest firms to substitute trade credit for financial credit, but in an interesting direction.  While 
one might hypothesize that the smallest firms in countries with little domestic credit are forced to 
substitute  more  trade  credit  for  the  lack  of  available  bank  credit,  we  find  the  opposite;  the 
substitution becomes more perfect as the banking system becomes more developed. We posit 
that this is due to changes in the non-financial purposes of trade credit as available domestic 
credit increases.   
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Figure 1 Domestic credit by country 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the time-series mean domestic credit of each country listed in the order of domestic credit. 
Domestic credit is the level of credit provided by the banking sector in each country-year scaled by GDP from 
the World Development Indicators. The underlying country for each data point is shown in Table 2 column (2). 
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Figure 2 Decomposition of ROE by level of domestic credit 
 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the country mean of each ROE component using all firm-year observations. The horizontal axis is 
the ranking of the country’s average domestic credit. Domestic credit is the level of credit provided by the banking 
sector in each country-year scaled by GDP from the World Development Indicators. The three components are ROE 
are defined in Section 2.2. 
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Table 1 Sample selection 
 
# of firm-years
564,446                    
(31,485)                    
Less: ROE > 100%, ROE < -100%, ROA>100%, ROA< -100% (65,438)                    
Less: Opearting performance >100%, Operating performance< -100%,  NBC >100%  (26,649)                    
Less: Truncate observations with extreme 1% leverage and spread (4,850)                      
Less: Country with less than 50 firm-years (12,670)                    
Less: Financial industries (64,699)                    
Total 343,718                  
Number of firm-years from 1990-2010 with total assets> 0, total NOA >0, and market 
cap > USD 1 million
Less: Missing interest and tax expense 
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Table 2 Distribution of mean performance by level of country domestic credit 
      
# of firm
years
Domestic 
credit
Operating 
performance
Financing 
performance
Trade 
performance
SAUDI ARABIA 341          0.101       0.111         (0.013)        0.026        
PERU 949          0.193       0.105         (0.018)        0.022        
VENEZUELA 230          0.201       0.117         (0.051)        (0.041)       
NIGERIA 144          0.256       0.129         (0.018)        0.067        
RUSSIAN FED. 1,110        0.271       0.103         (0.017)        0.013        
OMAN 253          0.333       0.121         (0.013)        0.052        
ARGENTINA 944          0.347       0.099         (0.034)        0.006        
MEXICO 1,840        0.382       0.096         (0.035)        0.006        
ROMANIA 344          0.394       0.085         (0.031)        (0.002)       
KENYA 104          0.421       0.139         0.008         0.030        
SRI LANKA 715          0.425       0.107         (0.022)        0.013        
COLOMBIA 272          0.443       0.101         (0.039)        (0.013)       
TURKEY 2,059        0.474       0.180         (0.078)        (0.031)       
PAKISTAN 1,331        0.474       0.127         (0.021)        0.035        
INDONESIA 3,408        0.475       0.097         (0.038)        0.014        
POLAND 1,841        0.491       0.075         (0.022)        0.021        
SLOVAKIA 72            0.529       0.059         (0.050)        (0.000)       
PHILIPPINES 1,874        0.533       0.071         (0.032)        0.007        
CZECH REP. 411          0.547       0.067         (0.032)        0.022        
QATAR 90            0.560       0.126         (0.019)        0.039        
LITHUANIA 146          0.573       0.043         (0.032)        0.009        
BAHRAIN 72            0.603       0.169         (0.056)        0.039        
BULGARIA 345          0.604       0.051         (0.033)        0.014        
INDIA 11,705      0.617       0.101         (0.007)        0.030        
SLOVENIA 151          0.646       0.066         (0.018)        (0.003)       
HUNGARY 439          0.649       0.095         (0.021)        (0.003)       
TUNISIA 71            0.710       0.138         (0.050)        0.020        
KUWAIT 425          0.719       0.092         (0.027)        0.014        
NORWAY 1,735        0.719       0.068         (0.034)        0.020        
FINLAND 1,980        0.736       0.094         (0.019)        0.015        
CROATIA 257          0.738       0.070         (0.047)        0.019        
SINGAPORE 6,767        0.756       0.067         (0.031)        0.031        
CHILE 1,880        0.818       0.089         (0.005)        0.015        
ISRAEL 1,645        0.819       0.067         (0.021)        0.018        
BRAZIL 4,577        0.820       0.127         (0.065)        0.016        
EGYPT 554          0.848       0.166         (0.049)        0.068        
# of firm
years
Domestic 
credit
Operating 
performance
Financing 
performance
Trade 
performance
LATVIA 117          0.866       0.060         (0.016)        0.017        
MOROCCO 270          0.881       0.118         (0.024)        0.066        
SOUTH KOREA 11,735      0.894       0.055         (0.044)        0.021        
ESTONIA 70            0.900       0.123         (0.041)        0.006        
IRELAND 1,157        0.973       0.090         (0.016)        0.020        
GREECE 3,369        1.003       0.081         (0.028)        0.002        
ITALY 4,874        1.030       0.071         (0.041)        0.008        
JORDAN 456          1.031       0.074         (0.032)        0.011        
AUSTRALIA 8,370        1.066       0.040         (0.011)        0.010        
FRANCE 10,097      1.086       0.093         (0.030)        0.010        
BELGIUM 1,951        1.125       0.087         (0.019)        0.013        
DENMARK 2,625        1.134       0.073         (0.034)        0.033        
PORTUGAL 994          1.156       0.081         (0.014)        0.001        
VIETNAM 1,161        1.166       0.136         (0.013)        0.041        
SWEDEN 4,457        1.183       0.058         (0.027)        0.039        
LUXEMBOURG 269          1.200       0.095         (0.012)        0.002        
NEW ZEALAND 1,252        1.210       0.077         0.002         0.013        
AUSTRIA 1,264        1.249       0.071         (0.021)        0.013        
GERMANY 9,709        1.275       0.069         (0.036)        0.022        
MALAYSIA 10,484      1.301       0.066         (0.030)        0.008        
THAILAND 7,451        1.331       0.088         (0.013)        0.017        
CHINA 14,917      1.346       0.064         (0.030)        0.023        
UK 24,062      1.371       0.071         (0.020)        0.033        
SPAIN 2,179        1.373       0.088         (0.019)        0.012        
NETHERLANDS 3,191        1.385       0.101         (0.013)        0.032        
HONG KONG 9,440        1.477       0.062         (0.034)        0.021        
CANADA 12,332      1.516       0.046         (0.015)        0.008        
SOUTH AFRICA 3,872        1.530       0.138         (0.039)        0.051        
SWITZERLAND 3,895        1.749       0.068         (0.026)        0.038        
US 79,753      1.902       0.063         (0.020)        0.019        
ICELAND 64            2.108       0.080         (0.012)        (0.011)       
CYPRUS 249          2.454       0.043         (0.030)        (0.010)       
JAPAN 56,551      2.950       0.031         (0.023)        0.026        
Mean 0.904       0.089         (0.027)        0.018        
STDev 0.455       0.032         0.016         0.019         
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This table shows the time-series mean domestic credit of each country and the country mean of each ROE component using all firm-year observations. 
Countries are listed in the order of the level of domestic credit. Domestic credit is the level of credit provided by the banking sector in each country-year 
scaled by GDP from the World Development Indicators.  
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Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
ROE 343,718        0.063 0.179 (1.000) 0.020 0.079 0.145 1.000
Operating performance 343,718        0.066 0.107 (0.976) 0.027 0.066 0.111 0.983
Financial performance 343,718        (0.025) 0.116 (1.490) (0.040) (0.005) 0.017 1.046
= Leverage 343,718        0.543 1.090 (0.858) (0.104) 0.284 0.829 12.95
X Spread  343,718        0.043 0.218 (0.917) (0.030) 0.024 0.112 1.099
Trade performance 343,718        0.021 0.079 (1.027) (0.001) 0.010 0.034 0.867
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
ROE 115,104        0.031    0.208    (1.000)     (0.009)   0.061    0.135      1.000    
Operating performance 115,104        0.053    0.140    (0.976)     0.013    0.061    0.117      0.983    
Financial performance 115,104        (0.037)   0.129    (1.490)     (0.057)   (0.012)   0.008      0.963    
= Leverage 115,104        0.307    0.926    (0.858)     (0.223)   0.092    0.542      12.761  
X Spread  115,104        0.032    0.256    (0.917)     (0.070)   0.022    0.143      1.083    
Trade performance 115,104        0.014    0.092    (0.949)     (0.007)   0.007    0.033      0.867    
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A All firms 
Panel B Firms in small size tercile 
Panel C Firms in large size tercile 
 
This table shows the descriptive of each ROE component. Panel A includes all firms in the sample and panel B(C) 
includes only firms in the highest (lowest) size tercile within each country-year. We sort firms into size terciles 
within each country-year. Size is defined as the year-end total assets.  See section 3.2 for the definition of each 
ROE component.  
   
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
ROE 114,040        0.091    0.151    (0.999)     0.040    0.094    0.156      0.998    
Operating performance 114,040        0.075    0.072    (0.780)     0.037    0.069    0.105      0.817    
Financial performance 114,040        (0.010)   0.104    (1.370)     (0.024)   0.001    0.028      0.815    
= Leverage 114,040        0.807    1.218    (0.856)     0.114    0.506    1.108      12.258  
X Spread  114,040        0.048    0.179    (0.910)     (0.012)   0.024    0.085      1.090    
Trade performance 114,040        0.026    0.066    (0.900)     0.001    0.013    0.035      0.821     
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(N=343,718) ROE
Operating 
performance
Financing 
performance Leverage Spread
Trade 
performance
ROE
Operating performance 0.877      
Financing performance 0.300       (0.013)          
Leverage (0.078)      (0.218)           0.344          
Spread 0.660       0.628             0.025           (0.385)     
Trade performance 0.773       0.698             (0.044)          (0.307)      0.662     
Domestic credit (0.157)      (0.282)           0.027           (0.068)      0.022      0.061          
(N=115,104) ROE
Operating 
performance
Financing 
performance Leverage Spread
Trade 
performance
ROE
Operating performance 0.908      
Financing performance 0.107       (0.167)          
Leverage (0.103)      (0.190)           0.218          
Spread 0.710       0.708             (0.148)          (0.395)     
Trade performance 0.833       0.782             (0.160)          (0.261)      0.725     
Domestic credit (0.141)      (0.234)           0.029           (0.088)      (0.004)     0.034          
(N=114,040) ROE
Operating 
performance
Financing 
performance Leverage Spread
Trade 
performance
ROE
Operating performance 0.848      
Financing performance 0.484       0.149            
Leverage (0.126)      (0.289)           0.393          
Spread 0.638       0.538             0.273           (0.353)     
Trade performance 0.707       0.595             0.064           (0.391)      0.579     
Domestic credit (0.164)      (0.333)           0.031           (0.010)      0.047      0.088          
Table 4 Spearman correlations by size treciles 
Panel A All firms 
Panel B Firms in smallest size tercile 
Panel C Firms in largest size tercile 
This table shows the spearman correlation of each ROE component and domestic credit. Panel A includes all 
firms in the sample and Panel B(C) includes only firms in the highest (lowest) size tercile within each 
country-year.  Size  is  defined  as  the  year-end  total  assets.  We  sort  firms  into  size  terciles  within  each 
country-year.  This  procedure  groups  together  similarly  ranked  firms  relative  to  the  other  firms  in  their 
country. Domestic credit is the level of credit provided by the banking sector in each country-year scaled by 
GDP from the World Development Indicators. See section 3.2 for definitions of each ROE component. 
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Table 5 Effect of domestic credit on financial performance by size treciles 
Panel A: Financial performance by size terciles 
 
Panel B: Leverage by size terciles 
 
Panel C: Spread by size tercile
VARIABLES
(1)
 All firms
(2) 
smallest size tercile
(3) 
middle size tercile
(4) 
largest size tercile
Domestic credit 0.007*** 0.005 0.007*** 0.014***
[0.001] [0.164] [0.001] [0.000]
Operating performance 0.070* -0.035 0.070* 0.371***
[0.082] [0.237] [0.082] [0.000]
Trade performance -0.504*** -0.483*** -0.504*** -0.557***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 343,695 115,089 114,566 114,040
Adjusted R-squared 0.104 0.122 0.105 0.112
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
SE cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year
VARIABLES
(1)
 All firms
(2) 
smallest size tercile
(3) 
middle size tercile
(4) 
largest size tercile
Domestic credit 0.025 0.004 -0.050 0.062
[0.565] [0.915] [0.221] [0.263]
Operating performance -0.364* -0.070 -0.880*** -2.220***
[0.051] [0.495] [0.000] [0.000]
Trade performance -1.912** -1.288** -2.278*** -1.404
[0.023] [0.025] [0.006] [0.176]
Observations 343,695 115,089 114,566 114,040
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.068 0.096 0.120
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year
VARIABLES
(1)
 All firms
(2) 
smallest size tercile
(3) 
middle size tercile
(4) 
largest size tercile
Domestic credit 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.020*** 0.019***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Operating performance 0.900*** 0.927*** 0.898*** 0.841***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Trade performance 1.212*** 1.152*** 1.297*** 1.213***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 343,695 115,089 114,566 114,040
Adjusted R-squared 0.565 0.639 0.538 0.452
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year 
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Notes: Panel A reports the estimation from an OLS regression of equation (2) where the dependent variable 
is financial performance. Panel B uses leverage and Panel C uses spread as the dependent variable. We sort 
firms into size terciles within each country-year. Size is defined as the year-end total assets.  Domestic 
credit is the level of credit provided by the banking sector in each country-year scaled by GDP from the 
World Development Indicators. All other variables are defined in section 3.2. Standard errors are clustered 
on year and country. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a 
two-tailed test. 
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Table 6 Effect of domestic credit on the trade-off between debt financing and trade 
credit 
 
Dependent variable: Financial performance 
 
 
This table reports the estimation from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is financial 
performance. Domestic credit is the level of credit provided by the banking sector in each country-
year scaled by GDP from the World Development Indicators. All other variables are defined in 
section 3.2. Standard errors are clustered on year and country. Significance is denoted by ***, **, 
and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
   
VARIABLES
(1)
 All firms
(2) 
smallest size 
tercile
(3) 
middle size 
tercile
(4) 
largest size 
tercile
Domestic credit 0.009*** 0.007** 0.011*** 0.014***
[0.000] [0.027] [0.000] [0.000]
Operating performance 0.073* -0.033 0.131** 0.372***
[0.052] [0.229] [0.012] [0.000]
Trade performance -0.335*** -0.280*** -0.367*** -0.509***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Domestic credit  -0.110*** -0.126*** -0.122* -0.032
X Trade performance [0.000] [0.000] [0.079] [0.224]
Observations 343,695 115,089 114,566 114,040
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.142 0.111 0.112
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
SE cluster country & year country & year country & yearcountry & year 
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Table 7 Effect of large shocks in domestic credit on financial performance 
 
Panel A: Spearman correlations, periods of shocks in domestic credit 
 
Panel B: Future changes in financial performance, periods with large increase in domestic credit 
 
Panel C: Future changes in financial performance, periods with large decrease in domestic credit 
 
This table reports the estimation from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is changes in financial 
performance  using  only  a  subsample  with  large  shocks  in  domestic  credit.  Shocks  in  domestic  credit  is 
defined as periods where the % changes in domestic credit is in the extreme 10% of the sample distribution. 
This corresponds to a 17% average increase in domestic credit (as a % of GDP) for the sample of periods with 
large increases (Panel B) and a -10% average drop for the sample of large decrease (Panel C). All other 
variables are defined in section 3.2 Standard errors are clustered on year and country. Significance is denoted 
by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
Changes in 
Domestic credit
Changes in 
Financial performance 
(t+1)
Changes in 
Operating  performance 
(t+1)
Changes in Domestic credit -
Changes in Financial performance (t+1) 0.023 -
Changes in Operating  performance (t+1) -0.040 -0.015 -
Changes in Trade performance (t+1) -0.075 -0.008 0.735
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
All firms smallest size tercile middle size tercile largest size tercile
Changes in domestic credit 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001** 0.001***
[0.000] [0.008] [0.001] [0.004]
Changes in future  operating performance 0.251*** 0.052 0.347*** 0.601***
[0.000] [0.272] [0.000] [0.000]
Changes in future trade performance -0.573*** -0.501*** -0.599*** -0.668***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 27,045 8,719 9,130 9,196
Adjusted R-squared 0.074 0.085 0.095 0.127
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year
VARIABLES
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
All firms smallest size tercile middle size tercile largest size tercile
Changes in domestic credit 0.001** 0.001** 0.0005* 0.001
[0.010] [0.018] [0.079] [0.132]
Changes in future  operating performance 0.199*** 0.062 0.267*** 0.455***
[0.000] [0.155] [0.000] [0.000]
Changes in future trade performance -0.576*** -0.540*** -0.654*** -0.567***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 27,032 8,762 9,145 9,125
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.101 0.075 0.085
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year
VARIABLES 
 
49 
Table 8 Sensitivity analysis 
 
Panel A Financial performance by size tercile, excluding Japan 
 
Panel B: Financial performance by size tercile, using a measure of financial development 
including the public debt market  
 
 
VARIABLES
(1)
 All firms
(2) 
smallest size tercile
(3) 
middle size tercile
(4) 
largest size tercile
Domestic credit 0.007** -0.005 0.006 0.020***
[0.035] [0.658] [0.117] [0.000]
Operating performance 0.050 -0.055** 0.103** 0.346***
[0.156] [0.014] [0.046] [0.000]
Trade performance -0.474*** -0.500*** -0.532*** -0.533***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 287144 96227 95713 95204
Adjusted R-squared 0.105 0.133 0.108 0.112
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
SE cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year
VARIABLES
(1)
 All firms
(2) 
smallest size tercile
(3) 
middle size tercile
(4) 
largest size tercile
Domestic credit 0.004*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.012***
+ Public debt market [0.000] [0.104] [0.000] [0.000]
Operating performance 0.089*** -0.030*** 0.157*** 0.439***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Trade performance -0.513*** -0.482*** -0.570*** -0.586***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 317947 106391 105976 105580
Adjusted R-squared 0.104 0.135 0.110 0.126
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year 
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel C Financial performance by size tercile, holdings accounting standards constant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A reports the estimation from an OLS regression of equation (2) after excluding Japan from the 
analysis. Panel B reports the estimation of equation (2) using an alternative measure of domestic credit. 
The measure of financial market development aggregates the domestic credit measure with the size of the 
public debt issued by financial institutions and corporations as a share of GDP (as a share of GDP).  The 
public debt market data is from the Bank of International Settlements and used in prior studies such as 
Beck et al (2009). Panel C reports the estimation of equation (2) after restricting the sample to firm-years 
use an international accounting standard, e.g., IFRS or U.S GAAP. Domestic credit is the level of credit 
provided  by  the  banking  sector  in  each  country-year  scaled  by  GDP  from  the  World  Development 
Indicators. The public debt variable is the private domestic debt securities issued by financial institutions 
and corporations as a share of GDP from the Bank of International Settlements (Beck et al. 2009). We sort 
firms into size terciles within each country-year. Size is defined as the year-end total assets.  All other 
variables are defined in section 3.2. Standard errors are clustered on year and country. Significance is 
denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
 
VARIABLES
(1)
 All firms
(2) 
smallest size tercile
(3) 
middle size tercile
(4) 
largest size tercile
Domestic credit 0.008** -0.003 0.008** 0.021***
[0.015] [0.272] [0.022] [0.000]
Operating performance 0.009*** -0.092*** 0.052 0.355***
[0.699] [0.000] [0.223] [0.000]
Trade performance -0.473*** -0.449*** -0.567*** -0.527***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 124510 38748 41167 44595
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.157 0.131 0.119
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
cluster country & year country & year country & year country & year